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Alice laughed. “ere’s no use trying,” she said: “one can’t believe
impossible things.” “I daresay you haven’t had much practice,” said
the Queen. “When I was your age, I always did it for half-an-hour a
day. Why, sometimes I’ve believed as many as six impossible things
before breakfast.” (fromrough the Looking-Glass)
Impossible things—e.g. that there are squares constructible using a straight-
edge and a compass that have the same area as some circle, that the Evening
Star is further away from the Sun than Venus, that numbers are ideas in the
mind, etc.—are things that are false nomatter what. Ine Impossible,1 Mark
Jago, siding with the White Queen, proposes an account of how impossible
things can be believed.e idea that impossible things can be believed, even
if it is preferable not to believe them, probably does not strike anyone as odd.
And there is no point defending a view nobody doubts. In order for the dis-
agreement between the White Queen and Alice to be interesting, we need
to consider what reasons we might have to go against common-sense and
agree with Alice.
e idea that it is impossible to believe impossible things has surfaced on
numerous occasions in philosophy. Empiricists (both the logical empiricists
and the regular kind), Kant, andWittgenstein all held it in some form or an-
other. More recently, the view has cropped up in connection with versions
of doxastic logic (e.g. Hintikka 1962), theories of information (e.g. Dretske
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1981), and theories of belief (e.g. Lewis 1979; Marcus 1983; Stalnaker 1984).2
What gives rise to Alice’s view in all of these cases is the thought that impos-
sibilities (as well as necessities) are, in some sense, empty—that there just is
not anything to believe in believing an impossibility. To see why impossibil-
ities (and necessities) might be thought of as empty, consider the following
argument.
e content of a declarative sentence, i.e. what we say when we utter
the sentence, is in some way determined by the conditions under which the
sentence is true.us, since impossibilities are true under no condition, they
also lack content. If nothing is said by an utterance of an impossibility, then
nothing is put forward for belief or disbelief, either. And so, we have reached
Alice’s view.is is one of four arguments that Jago considers (see 3–4). All
four are tightly linked to what Jago refers to as the possible worlds approach—
an approach to modelling content, belief, and other related phenomena in
terms of possible worlds. What exactly possible worlds are is a controversial
metaphysical issue, one that Jago addresses later in the book, but we get an
intuitive idea by thinking of truth-conditions of sentences in the following
way: if they obtain, then we live in a world in which the sentence is true, and
if they do not, then we live in a world in which the sentence is false. Taking
this intuitive sense of ‘world’, we can speak of all the worlds in which the
sentence is true and all the worlds in which it is false. Truth-conditions of a
sentence, since they determine exactly when the sentence is true, can then
be seen as delineating the set of all worlds in which the sentence is true. And
a belief e.g. that it is raining can be seen as a relation a subject stands in to
worlds in which ‘it is raining’ is true, or more simply, to worlds in which it is
raining. Many other things, besides content and belief, have been modelled
in this way. In chapter 1, Jago gives a clear overview of this approach and
its utility, one that can also serve as a good introduction to someone who is
new to the idea.
In chapter 2, Jago gives a detailed overview of themain problemwith the
possible worlds approach, known in the literature as the problem of hyperin-
tensionality. In a nutshell, the problem is that distinctions that the possible
worlds approach allows us to draw between contents are not ne enough for
all purposes, e.g. for modelling belief. As the White Queen points out, it
seems that we can believe impossible things, but, if a belief that p is mod-
elled as a relation to possible worlds in which ‘p’ is true, then, since there
are no possible worlds in which impossible things are true, it is predicted
that impossible things are never believed. And this is not the only strange
result we get. Necessary truths—things that are true no matter what—are
true in every possible world. And thus, whichever possible worlds a subject
2 I have borrowed the term ‘Alice’s view’ from (Marcus 1983).
Indrek Lõbus iii
is related to in believing something, they thereby count as believing all the
necessary truths, and conversely, if there is some necessary truth you fail to
believe, e.g. some complicated mathematical theorem, it follows that you
believe nothing at all. Similarly, if the truth of ‘p’ necessarily guarantees the
truth of ‘q’ (e.g. by logically entailing it), then any world in which ‘p’ is true
is also a world in which ‘q’ is true, and thus, a subject who believes that p
thereby counts as believing that q, nomatter how complicated the reasoning
is that would lead from ‘p’ to ‘q’ (or whether it is even possible to reason from
‘p’ to ‘q’). All of these results seem obviously false. In short, then, as soon as
wemove into the territory of impossibility and necessity, the possible worlds
approach seems to just break down.
In addition to thewell-known issues described above, Jago also identies
an interesting new issue with the possible worlds approach, one that is quite
independent of belief. To use his example (48), necessary truths like . . .
(a) Puss is cray or Puss is not cray
(b) Rover is snoring or Rover is not snoring
. . . seem to have dierent contents. (a) is about Puss and not about Rover,
and (b) is about Rover and not about Puss. So, (a) and (b), although both
necessary truths, are about dierent things, and thus we say dierent things
when we utter them. But when modelled using possible worlds, the two
sentences are predicted to say the same thing.3
Aer elaborating on the problems that the possible worlds approach
faces, Jago identies three ways to proceed. We can either i) try to explain
away hyperintensional phenomena, thereby saving the possible worlds ap-
proach, ii) abandon the possible worlds approach and try something com-
pletely dierent, or iii) try to nd an extension of the possible worlds ap-
proach that can handle hyperintensionality. In the latter half of chapter 2,
Jago considers and rejects various attempts at taking the rst route, most no-
tably by Robert Stalnaker (1984). Jago does however sympathizes with the
motivation for taking the rst route, namely to retain the possible worlds
approach which, as he puts it, is “one of philosophy’s success stories” (13).
3 ough, a possible response to this problem might be that (a) and (b) are not really nec-
essary truths.eir logical forms may be unpacked respectively as . . .
(a′) ∃x(Puss = x ∧ (x is cray ∨ ∼x is cray))
(b′) ∃x(Rover = x ∧ (x is snoring ∨ ∼x snoring))
If the existence of Puss and Rover is contingent, then the two sentences, despite the appear-
ance of being instances of the Law of ExcludedMiddle, would also be contingent. Whether
the existence of individuals is contingent is a controversial issue in metaphysics and logic.
For a discussion of it, see (Williamson 2013).
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We should thus not be too quick to dismiss it entirely by going for the sec-
ond route. Additionally, in chapter 3, Jago identies problems with the most
popular alternative to the possible worlds approach: the view that contents
of sentences are nely structured entities which have little to do with truth-
conditions and are very similar to sentences themselves.4 It should, how-
ever, be noted that some of the problems that Jago points out in the struc-
turalist account, like Frege’s puzzle concerning substitutions of co-referential
expressions, have been solved by contemporary proponents of the view.5
Jago’s own strategy for dealing with the problem of hyperintensional-
ity is to take the third route. Being sympathetic to the possible worlds ap-
proach, Jago aims to preserve as much of it as he thinks can be preserved.
With structuralism now the mainstream view, the possible worlds approach
is usually mentioned only in passing and is generally dismissed out of hand.
is makes Jago’s approach refreshing. His proposal is to extend the pos-
sible worlds approach by adding impossible worlds to it. Impossible worlds
are simply worlds in which some impossibilities are true. With such worlds
included in the picture, we can keep the idea from the possible worlds ap-
proach that sentences pick out worlds in virtue of being true in them, but
we now have worlds for sentences like ‘1+1=1’ to pick out as well. Because of
this, we can keep modelling beliefs as we did before but without having to
agree with Alice, since there are now worlds one can relate to in believing
impossible things.
e idea of introducing impossible worlds in this way to solve the prob-
lem of hyperintensionality is itself not new.6 What makes Jago’s proposal
original is his defense of the impossible worlds approach against two serious
objections. One of them, which is also the most common objection against
any appeal to impossible worlds, is that impossible worlds, much more so
than possible worlds, are metaphysically suspect. In chapter 4, Jago con-
siders and rejects most of the mainstream metaphysical accounts of worlds.
e clarity and detail with which he does this are particularly noteworthy,
making the chapter (like his chapter on the possible worlds approach) an
excellent introduction to those who are new to the topic. Jago works out
his own metaphysical account of worlds in chapter 5, defending a version
of linguistic ersatzism, the view that worlds (in this case both possible and
impossible worlds) are sets of sentences. To get sentences suitable for such
a task, Jago, taking inspiration from Carnap (1947), denes an exotic world-
making language which has as its atomic expressions things that natural lan-
4 It should be noted that aer the publication of his book, Jago (2015) has proposed ways of
reconciling his view with at least some versions of structuralism.
5 See e.g. (Soames 2010); (Hanks 2015).
6 See e.g. (Hintikka 1975); (Rantala 1982); (Barwise 1997).ere are many others.
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guage atomic expressions pick out in the (real) world. Jago, in other words,
shows how the world—the real world—around us can be seen as made up of
sentences. e result is sophisticated and elegant. Especially noteworthy is
his defense of the existence of negative facts and the use he puts them to in
solving the problem of non-actual entities—the main obstacle in defending
any form of ersatzism.
e other problem that the impossible worlds approach faces is this: al-
though we do not want logical relations to provide links between contents
which are so strong as to imply Alice’s view, we still want them to provide
some kind of link. For example, when we say that someone knows that the
weather is cold and rainy, there is, as Jago notes, something very strange
about saying that they do not know that the weather is cold.e obvious ex-
planation for this strangeness is that ‘the weather is cold and rainy’ logically
implies ‘the weather is cold’. e problem of how to account for this while
avoiding falling back into the idea that we know (and believe) everything
that logically follows from what we know (and believe) is what Jago refers
to as the problem of bounded rationality. Jago introduces the problem and
considers some responses to it in chapter 6. In chapters 7 and 8, he develops
his own response to the problem: that logical relations establish normative
links between contents, links one must respect to count as rational.7 e
main obstacle in this that Jago focuses on is that people who we count as
rational must fail to respect some of those normative links. If they didn’t,
they would be ideally rational, and they are not. Jago elegantly overcomes
this issue by showing that in such cases it will always be indeterminatewhich
link the person fails to respect, and consequently, since it is irrational for us
to take something indeterminate to be true, we can never rationally count
others as being irrational in such cases.
ere are a few problems with Jago’s proposal. One issue, also pointed
out in (Nolan 2015), is that linguistic ersatzism, including Jago’s version of it,
turns truth-conditional semantics into a form of translational semantics—
we end up analyzing the contents of sentences in terms of more sentences,
albeit in the worldmaking language. What we eventually want from a se-
mantic theory, however, is an account of the relation that language bears to
the non-linguistic reality. In the last chapter of the book, Jago considers this
worry in passing.e response he gives is that sentences in his worldmaking
language are constructed from worldly entities. And so, his account of con-
tent “does make contact” with non-linguistic reality (263). But this response
fails to address the real issue. Although sentences in the worldmaking lan-
guage have worldly entities as constituents, they have them as syntactic con-
7 For a similar treatment of the problem of bounded rationality, see (Jenkins Ichikawa and
Jarvis 2013).
vi Mark Jago, The Impossible: An Essay on Hyperintensionality
stituents. Jago does introduce a semantics for them, namely by stipulating
that each atomic expression in the worldmaking language has itself as its se-
mantic value, roughly speaking.8 But this does not seem to help. To break
the circle of attaching sentences to sentences, we need to introduce genuine
truth-conditions at some point. Perhaps there is an obvious way it can be
done in Jago’s framework, but his response to the objection leaves it unclear.
Another problemwith the book, though not with Jago’s own view, is that
his criticism of Stalnaker’s attempt at explaining away hyperintensionality
relies on a somewhat sloppy reading. ere are paragraphs in Stalnaker’s
book (1984: chs. 4–5) from which Jago cites where Stalnaker explicitly con-
siders and responds to objections that Jago raises. Stalnaker’s account of de-
ductive inquiry has two parts which, Stalnaker (see 1984, 77–76) emphasizes,
are only plausible when considered in conjunction. However, Jago consid-
ers and rejects the two parts separately, thereby attacking two straw-men.
For example, on page 84, Stalnaker directly engages with an objection akin
to Jago’s, showing how the interplay between the two parts of his account
block it.
A nal issue I want to raise concerns Jago’s general strategy of trying
to explain hyperintensional phenomena by developing an extension of the
model employed in the possible worlds approach. ere is no shortage of
such extensions. Some of them (e.g. Rantala 1982) introduce impossible
worlds, others (e.g. Egré 2006) do not. What makes the possible worlds
approach interesting is not the model it employs but the philosophical rea-
sons for thinking that the approach, contrary to appearances, is correct. Jago
does not seriously engagewith those philosophical reasons (although he lists
some of them in the introduction). To provide a fully satisfactory response
to Alice, we need to move away from questions about how to model hyper-
intensionality and ask instead whether we can make sense of it.
Despite these issues, Jago’s book is an important addition to the litera-
ture on hyperintensionality. Jago’s emphasis on the virtues of the possible
worlds approach serves as a reminder of what we give up when we follow
the contemporary trend of structuralism. His articulation of the problem of
bounded rationality and his defense of a solution to it set an important and
yet relatively unexplored constraint on any account of hyperintensionality
that even those who side with Alice need to address. Hopefully,e Impos-
sible will come to mark a point where the debate between the White Queen
and Alice starts to get the attention it deserves.
8 is is true of predicates in the worldmaking language. Referring expressions get a more
sophisticated treatment. See chapter 5 for details.
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